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Wirenius: The Taylor Law at 50

THE TAYLOR LAW AT 50

John F. Wirenius, Chair,NYS PERB *
I. "THE REST IS PROCEDURAL"
In 1969, Jerome Lefkowitz, then Deputy Chair of the Public
Employment Relations Board ("PERB"), used the story of the pagan who
asked the great Jewish sage Hillel to explain the substance of Judaismwhile standing on one foot-to make a point.' As Lefkowitz retold the
story, Hillel raised one foot, and quickly answered, "[t]he substance of
Judaism is to love thy neighbor as thyself. All the rest is procedural. Now
you must go2 and study the procedures so as to be able to accomplish the
substance."
Lefkowitz then drew the parallel:
[t]he substance of the Taylor Law can also be stated
briefly. It is that public employees have the right to join
or not to join any employee organization of their own
choosing, and that public employers are required to
negotiate with the employee organizations which have
been chosen by their employees to represent them. All
the rest is procedural.3
This statement holds true today, a half-century after the enactment of
the Taylor Law.
The relegation of "all the rest" to "procedure" may seem jarring but

* John F. Wirenius is the Chairperson of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board.
John is a graduate of Fordham University and the Columbia University School of Law.
1.

Jerome Lefkowitz, The Taylor Law, Discrimination and Nontenured Teachers, 20 LAB.

L.J. 575, 575 (1969).
2.

Id.

3. Id.
4. Public Employees' Fair Employment Act of 1967, ch. 392, 1967 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1527,
1527-28 (recognizing that the statute is generally known as the "Taylor Law" as it is based upon the
recommendations in a report to the Governor of a committee headed by Professor George W. Taylor
of the University of Pennsylvania).
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bear in mind that "sometimes substantive values cannot be achieved
except by reshaping the process for an area of law. Thus, in addition to
substantive rules arising from procedural opportunities or shortcomings,
procedural rules often serve substantive objectives."5 Or, as Oliver
Wendell Holmes put it as long ago as 1881, "whenever we trace a leading
doctrine of substantive law far enough back, we are very likely to find
some forgotten circumstance of procedure at its source." 6 From almost
the dawn of the Anglo-American system, through the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and beyond, substantive legal
reform has been accomplished by crafting procedures that "nudge" or
steer the parties in a particular direction, mandated by a policy decision. 7
The Taylor Law is just such a statute; it creates what has been called
a "choice architecture" system, one that in ways both overtly and subtly
guides the parties to a desired outcome.8 In the Taylor Law, that preferred
outcome is for the parties to collectively negotiate terms and conditions
of employment and to resolve differences at the bargaining table, until it
is clear that no such resolution is possible at that time.9 Only in the last
resort, and only for employees in specific public safety positions, is
interest arbitration available to settle a contract, and even that is for a
sharply limited time.' 0
At the core of the Taylor Law, as Lefkowitz's parable suggests, are

5.
Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedurein Public Person Defamation Cases. The Impact ofthe
FirstAmendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 224 (1987).
6.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Lecture VII, in THE COMMON LAW 247, 253 (1881).
7. PAUL BRAND, Henry 11 and the Creation of the English Common Lmv, in HENRY u: NEW
INTERPRETATIONS 215, 239-40, 241 (Christopher Harper-Bill & Nicholas Vincent eds., 2007); see
also Joseph Biancalana, For Want of Justice: Legal Reforms of Heny 11, 88 COLUM L. REV. 433,
433-34 (1988); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil
Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 910 (1987).
8. Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture, in THE
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY, 428, 428, 429-30 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013); see also
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WELFARE, AND HAPPINESS, ch. 5 (2008).
9.
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(2) (Consol. 1995).
10. For most other non-pedagogical employees, if no agreement results after fact-finding, the
appropriate legislative body may, for one budget period, "take such action as it deems to be in the
public interest, including the interest of the public employees involved." N.Y. Civ Serv. Law § 209(3)
(e) (iv). However, under the so-called "Triborough Amendment," § 209-a. I (e) of the Taylor Law
(added by 1982 Laws c. 921), an employer commits an improper practice if it "refuse[s] to continue
all the terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated." Thus, the "legislative
body is precluded... from imposing a settlement which diminishes employee rights under an expired
collective bargaining agreement." In re Count, of Niagara v. Newman, 104 A.D.2d 1, 4 (4th Dept
1984); City afIthaca, 51 PERB
3010, 3083-3084 (2018). For pedagogues, the Taylor Law only
allows negotiation, with statutory non-binding impartial assistance, until agreement is reached. N.Y.
CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(f). (Consol. 1995).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol36/iss1/2

2

Wirenius: The Taylor Law at 50

2018]

THE TAYLOR LA WAT50

two correlative values-the recognition of the right of employees to be
represented and to bargain collectively, and the duty of both the employer
and the selected employee organization to negotiate over terms and
conditions of employment.'' As Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller phrased
it in his memorandum approving the bill, the Taylor Law's "primary
impact will be to impose upon the public employer, the public employee
and the employee organization a joint responsibility for solving
employment relations without injury to the public interest.' 12 Professor
George W. Taylor, who chaired the committee that proposed the law that
is called by his name, agreed. 3 For Taylor, the law's reciprocal expansion
of employee rights, which was concomitant with reaffirming employee
organizations' duty to the public, made it a landmark: "Eflective
participationby employees in the determination of their conditions of
employment," 14he emphasized (quite literally), "is the basic idea behind
the new law.",
That basic idea of employee input through collective bargaining has
flourished in New York, as has the value of mutual reciprocal duties owed
by both management and labor not only to each other, but, ultimately, to
the people of the State.' 5 New York's Taylor Law has respected those
reciprocal duties, with the vast majority of public sector employees' terms
and conditions of employment being negotiated between management and
of
labor, while collective negotiations have also ensured the delivery
6
services with almost no interruptions due to workplace disputes.'
The achievement of the Taylor Law is especially impressive in the
light of the performance of its predecessor, the Condon-Wadlin Act, in
effect from 1947 until its repeal and replacement by the Taylor Law in
11.
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act of 1967, ch. 392, 1967 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1527,
1527-28.
12. Public Employees' Fair Employment Act of 1967, ch. 392, 1967 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1527,
1527-28 (acknowledging that those reciprocal duties are in the statute's text; for example, § 207 (c),
provides that in determining the appropriate composition of a bargaining unit, "the unit shall be
compatible with the joint responsibilities of the public employer and public employees to serve the
public.").
13. See generally George W. Taylor, Strikes in Public Employment, 85 GOOD GOv'T, Spring
1968, at 9 (discussing the recognition resulting from the new law that employers have a responsibility
to work with their employees to foster effective participation by employees in setting their conditions
of employment).
14. See id.; see also GEORGE W. TAYLOR ET AL., GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUB. EMP.
REL. FINAL REP. 9, 19 (1966) http://www.perb.ny.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/1966-TaylorCom mittee-Report.pdf.
15. See Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairwoman, N.Y. State Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., The
Challenges Faced by the Collective Bargaining Process, Presentation at the Pub. Emp't Relations Bd.,
Cornell, & Office of Collective Bargaining Conference 2-3 (Dec. 2, 1997).

16.

See id. at 5-6.
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1967.17 Condon-Wadlin simply barred strikes, and deemed strikers to
have abandoned their jobs, allowing the employer to re-hire those
employees if it chose to, but requiring the erstwhile strikers to serve a fiveyear probationary period, and barring any pay raises for three years after
their re-hiring. 18 While Condon-Wadlin was formidable on paper, "[tihe
prevailing viewpoint, however, was that the act had been
unenforceable."' 9 The problem of enforcement was not restricted to New
York and Condon-Wadlin; as the great legal scholar Glanville Williams
summarized:
Attempts have been made to make strikes illegal by
statute in Australia and New Zealand and also in England
when the National Arbitration Order was in force. Such
attempts remain virtually dead letters because of the
practical difficulties of enforcement. It is not practical
politics to imprison or fine hundreds of thousands of
strikers; and even if legal action is directed against their
leaders, the result generally2 °is to turn them into martyrs
and prolong the dissension.
In sharp contrast to the dim view of collective bargaining taken by
the United States Supreme Court in its recent decision in Janus v.
AFSCME,2 1 then PERB Chair Harold Newman in 1984 hearkened back to
the seminal Steelworkers Trilogy, in which "Justice Douglas wrote some
words that every labor relations professional should remember:"
The collective bargaining agreement ... is more than a

contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of
cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.... A

collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a
system of industrial self-government. When most parties
enter into contractual relationship, they do so voluntarily,
17. See LEFKOWITZ ON PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT LAW at 24, 30-31 (William A. Herbert
et. al. eds., 4th ed. 2016).
18. See id. at 24.

19.

Id at 25.

20.

THEODORE W. KHEEL, REPORT TO SPEAKER ANTHONY J. TRAVIA ON THE TAYLOR LAW

13 (1968).
21.

Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2483 (2018) (Claiming that "[the] ascendance of

public-sector unions has been marked by a parallel increase in public spending," and that while "[n]ot
all that increase can be attributed to public-sector unions, of course, but the mounting costs of publicemployee wages, benefits, and pensions undoubtedly played a substantial role.").
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in the sense that there is no real compulsion to deal with
one another, as opposed to dealing with other parties. This
is not true of the labor agreement. The choice is generally
not between entering or refusing to enter into a
relationship, for that in all probability preexists the
negotiations. Rather, it is between having the relationship
governed by an agreed-upon rule of law or leaving each
and every matter subject to a temporary resolution
dependent solely upon the relative strength, at any given
moment, of the contending forces.22
Under the Taylor Law, unilateral action-whether by management
or by labor-is heavily disincentivized; the statute prohibits employers
from "refus[ing] to continue all the terms of an expired agreement until a
new agreement is negotiated"-unless the union has violated its own
obligation not to strike.23 Unilateral action (i.e., a strike) by a union results
in fines and forfeiture of dues deduction privileges, as well as freeing
management to act unilaterally, pursuant to the Triborough Amendment.2 4
Again, the point of the statute is to draw the parties toward a negotiated
This reflects former Board Chair Pauline Kinsella's
resolution.
description of "the basic social contract which underlies the public policy
in favor of collective bargaining: the employer gives up some of its power
(and profit) to employees, and in return, work will be performed
efficiently and without disruption. 25
Controversial as it was at the time, the prohibition of strikes was seen
by the framers of the Taylor Law as a necessary precondition of
productive collective negotiation between public employers and
employees.26 However, it is fair to note that the authors of the Taylor
Law, and its early implementers at PERB, had strongly held general
philosophical objections to strikes against government employers.2 7

22.
Harold R. Newman, Reactions of a Passionate Observer, in THE ELEMENTS OF GOOD
PRACTICES IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 1984 PROCEEDINGS, TWELFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 8, 12

(Soc'y of Prof I in Disp. Resol., 1985) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960) (alteration in original)).
23. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 209-a (1)(e) (Consol. 1995); N.Y. CiV. SERV. LAW § 210(2)(a)
(Consol. 1995).
24. See N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 210 (3) (a), 208(l)(b), 210.1 (Consol. 1995).
25. Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairwoman, N.Y. State Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., The Challenges
Faced by the Collective Bargaining Process, Presentation at the Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., Cornell,
& Office of Collective Bargaining Conference 4 (Dec. 2, 1997).
26. Taylor, supra note 13, at9, 13.
27.

TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 14, at 42.
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Professor Taylor declared that the prohibition of strikes, "I believe, is
designed not simply as protection against the interruption of vital services,
but--even more importantly-to preserve the processes of representative,
28
democratic government to which we are dedicated.,
Likewise, Robert Helsby, PERB's first Chair, viewed "a strike
against the government [a]s in the nature of insurrection, or at least civil
disobedience., 29 He also contended that the stakes were fundamentally
different, explaining that "government, unlike private employers, ....
cannot liquidate its business and reinvest its funds elsewhere; it is obliged
by law to provide specified services, some essential, others less
essential., 30 Finally, Helsby was concerned that "the injury which a strike
by government employees inflicts upon innocent victims is greater than
3
that which follows most strikes in the private sector.", '
Jerry Lefkowitz put the matter more bluntly, describing "collective
bargaining, insofar as it relies upon the strike threat," as a "throwback" to
"Ordeal by Battle," and adding that "in labor disputes, Ordeal by Battle is
more likely to hurt innocent bystanders" than had been the case at
common law. 32 Lefkowitz pointed out that the "history of jurisprudence
has been the gradual displacement of such tests of strength by rational
judgments," Lefkowitz maintained that, unlike a private sector strike,
which he described as a "test of economic strength," a public sector strike
is "a political challenge," an effort to "change the public climate" by
inflicting discomfort on the citizenry. 33 Indeed, Lefkowitz wrote that an
illegal strike should be viewed as an act of civil disobedience, but not a
justified one absent "a situation where a government by its provocative
conduct may precipitate a situation which suppresses the dignity of its
employees."34 Apart from their rule of law and democratic-theory based
28. Taylor, supra note 13, at 10.
29.
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman, Report to the Select Joint Legislative Committee on Public
Employees' Relations 3 (1970).

30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 3-4.

32.
Jerome Lefkowitz, Civil Servants and the Strike, 85 GOOD GOv'T, Spring 1986, at 15.
Although Lefkowitz was not a member of the Taylor Committee and did not have any role in drafting
its report, he was "assigned the task of drafting legislation that would "embody the Taylor
Committee's specific proposals." Lefkowitz also served as Deputy Chairperson from the agency's
formation until 1987. In that capacity, he was the architect of PERB's Rules of Procedure. RONALD
DONOVAN, ADMINISTERING THE TAYLOR LAW: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN NEW YORK. 6465, 157 (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, Issue 23) (1990).
33.
Id. at 18.
34. Id. at 19-20. Lefkowitz did acknowledge that provocation arising to a denial of the
fundamental dignity of labor could justify or excuse a strike. Id. at 20. Absent such provocation,
Lefkowitz rather harshly opined that "for government employees to engage in civil disobedience in
order to fatten their pay envelopes by a few dollars" was "an abuse of the technique." Id.
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dislike for strikes, Lefkowitz, Taylor, Helsby, and Rockefeller all viewed
strikes as subverting the bargaining relationship by violating the
reciprocal duties inherent in the right to negotiate.3 5
In the past half-century, unilateral action by either labor or
management has greatly diminished.3 6 Public employers throughout the
state have successfully acclimated to negotiating terms and conditions of
employment, and unions have found their best recourse at the table, not in
the streets.37 While the advertising disclaimer that past performance is no
guarantee of future results must be borne in mind, the overwhelming
majority of public employers and employee organizations have healthy,
two metrics that
well-functioning relationships, as established by the
38
disputes.
resolving
and
agreements
reaching
matter:
II.

A NEUTRAL, INDEPENDENT AGENCY

Writing about those early years after the enactment of the statute and
the formation of PERB to administer the law, Lefkowitz noted that the
future of both "did not appear very promising":
Passed by a reluctant legislature under pressure from an
aggressive governor, it was opposed by most local
governments and practically all public sector unions. The
local governments were disturbed that the statute's policy
of fostering collective bargaining would compromise the
authority of elected government to manage municipal
affairs. The unions, for their part, were unwilling to settle
for a law that continued to deprive them of a legal right to
strike, and they were convinced that a law administered
by an agency, the heads of which were appointed by the
governor, the boss of the largest contingent of public
employees, could not be trusted.39
Despite these bleak circumstances, "the Taylor Law and the Board
became accepted fixtures within a few years after the statute took

35.
See id. at 16, 19; Taylor, supra note 13, at 10.
36.
See infra Part III.
37.
See infra Part IlL
38. See infra PartII.
39. Jerome Lefkowitz, Joseph Crowley-A Dedicated Public Servant, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
468, 469 (1986).
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effect." 40 The late labor historian Ronald Donovan wrote that PERB's
handling of the hotly contested representation proceedings for state
employees in 1967-1969 "was absolutely critical in determining the future
of the agency."4' Had the agency been overly deferential, "[t]he result
42
would have confirmed the allegations of the law's sharpest critics.
Instead, Donovan noted, "PERB came through a difficult period with its
independence and integrity secured," and that "[a] good deal of the credit
' 3
for this success belongs to PERB's chairman, Robert Helsby. 4
After he left PERB, Helsby explained his vision of how PERB was
meant to function:
At the heart of a responsible labor relations system is an
independent and an impartial group of professional
neutrals who decide the controversial issues with
consistency and integrity on the basis of objectivity and
merit. These professionals must, of course, be allowed to
be insulated from political interference and lobbying. 44
Harold Newman, who succeeded Helsby as Chair, hewed to the same
vision of his role.45 As he put it, "[w]e see our role as implementors of
the statute, not as policymakers in any sense that we shall try to influence
major changes in the law," adding that "[w]e try to maintain our neutrality
and objectivity, and leave the public policy questions to the Governor and
the Legislature. 4 6 PERB's Executive Director, Ralph Vatalaro agreed;
emphasizing that "[t]he best we can do is to gain the respect of the two
' 47
parties to a dispute, that we do our jobs in an objective and fair manner. 5
Vatalaro pointed out the classic neutral's dilemma by stating, "[w]e
40. Id.
41.
See Donovan, supra note 32, at 100.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. In memorializing Board member Joseph Crowley, Lefkowitz described Helsby as "a
man of rectitude, and a superb administrator," who "organized a strong staff and motivated it to
perform in accordance with the principles that he and Joe had set." Lefkowitz, supra note 39, at 469.
44.
Robert D. Helsby, One Man's View of the Taylor Law-Thirteen Years Later Governor's
Conference on Public Sector Bargaining 7 (Nov. 12, 1980).
45. See Fifteen Years of the Taylor Law: Viable But Still Imperfect, THE CI-IIEF-LEADER, Aug.
27, 1982, at 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. Ralph Vatalaro was appointed Director of Information and Education upon the
founding of the agency and subsequently served as Executive Director from 1970 to 1990. See id.;
see also DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 62-63; Ralph Vatalaro: Obituary, THE ONEIDA DAILY
DISPATCH: THE LEGACY (June 7, 2015)
https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/oneidadispatch/obituary.aspx?n-ralph=
vatalaro&pid 175017505&fhid=13157.
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cannot expect to have both parties to a specific controversy like what we
do-because in virtually all that we do there is a winner and 48a loser, and
somebody, PERB, usually, has to make the pronouncement.,
At times, this has created heat for PERB and its personnel-Alton
Marshall, an alumnus of the Rockefeller Administration, remembered that
"Helsby was considered a god dam [sic] Benedict Arnold., 49 At around
the same time, the editor of The Civil Service Leader denigrated Jerry
Lefkowitz and Director of Representation Paul Klein as would-be "Labor
Messiahs" and demanded their firing.50 Even George Taylor "often
remarked, somewhat ruefully, that the resulting enactment was called the
Taylor Law only because the politicians knew that Taylor would never
run for office.'

In the early years, denunciations by labor as well as friction with
employers was common; Helsby noted that "[w]ithin a month after the
Taylor Law was passed, some 15,000 unionists gathered in Madison
Square Garden to denounce the Law and establish a fund for its repeal."52
Currently, and for the past four decades, no such ructions disfigure
PERB's relationships with the parties. That is not to say that specific
decisions have not been controversial, or that both sides to a given dispute
are always pleased with the outcome of any given case; I recall as deputy
chair attending a public meeting at which PERB's non-intervention in a
matter in which no proceeding before the agency had been commenced
was scathingly criticized.
Case-specific unhappiness with particular outcomes, though, does
not remotely resemble the systemic objections, in some instances
amounting to open hostility, to the Taylor Law and to PERB itself that
marked the early days.53 In large part, I believe, this reflects the agency's
success in preserving its integrity and its neutrality. While this reflects
great credit on the staff and board members of PERB over the years, it
also reflects on the architectonic structure of the agency. Put more simply,
neutrality and freedom from political pressure are baked into the structure

48. Id.
49. Interview with Alton Marshall, Secretary, Governor Rockefeller (Apr. 30, 1985);
DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 77.
50. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 85.
Helsby, supra note 44, at 4.
51.
52. Robert D. Helsby, Chairman, N.Y. State Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., Labor Relations in the
Public Sector-A Political Approach for a Democratic Society, Address at the IRRA Annual Spring
Meeting and IIRA Pan American Regional Meeting (May 3, 1973) 10.
53. See generally Bernard T. King, The TaylorAct Experiment in PublicEmployer-Employee
Relations, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 7, 9 (1968) (asserting instances of unfairness and unreasonableness
resulting from PERB's procedures).
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of PERB.
As the former Executive Director Ralph Vatalaro said in an interview
almost thirty years ago, "PERB is independent with built-in safeguards to
keep politics out of the Board. 5 4 Board members "are appointed for sixyear terms, one each on odd-numbered years. '55 In addition to the
staggered terms, the Taylor Law provides that "[n]ot more than two
members of the board shall be members of the same political party,"
56
another check against political pressure.
Most importantly, however, as Vatalaro noted in 1978, the
"governors have made it a practice to appoint only highly qualified and
experienced people to the board., 5 7 In fact, "all the board members (since
1967) have been experienced in labor relations, arbitration, mediation,
and/or labor law prior to their appointments.
Two years later, Helsby
noted:
[W]e in New York have been fortunate to have had
Governors who have understood the collective bargaining
process and the need for a neutral agency of this type.
There has been no attempt to politicize its organization,
its procedures, operations, or the substance of its
decisions .... Likewise, it [New York] has every right to
be proud of the high caliber of the members it has
appointed to the Board and the reputation the Board has
earned for competence and integrity, not only in New
York but across the Nation.5 9
From my position as Chair in 2019, I firmly agree with Bob Helsby
that the independence, integrity and quality of the Board and its
members-and I would add its Directors, Administrative Law Judges, and
Conciliation staff-are the hallmarks of PERB.6 ° I also agree with
Pauline Kinsella that they are the primary reasons for its success and the
success of the Taylor Law for fifty years.

54.

The Civil Services Employees Association: PERB: Neutrality Important, THE PUBLIC
Dec. 13, 1978, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
N.Y. Ctv. SERV. LAW § 205(1) (Consol. 1995).
The Civil Service Employees Association, supra note 54, at 7.
The Civil Service Employees Association, supra note 54, at 7.
Helsby, supra note 44, at 8.
60. Helsby, supra note 44, at 7.

SECTOR,
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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III. "ACCOMPLISHTNG THE SUBSTANCE"
According to PERB's internal statistics, 85% of public employers
reach agreements with the unions representing their employees. 6' 15% of
impasses involve public safety employees, and approximately 40-45% of
these go to binding arbitration.6 2
Additionally, the Taylor Law has virtually eliminated strikes-since
2012, only one declared strike has taken place, involving adjunct faculty
at Nassau Community College in 2013.63 While there have been several
strike charges filed in the past decade, most have involved equivocal
behavior such as suspected slowdowns or sick outs. 64 Such charges have
two or fewer per year, and have been settled
averaged approximately
65
without adjudication.
The Empire Center's Terry O'Neill and E.J. McMahon have
suggested that the credit for the reduction of strikes to the Taylor Law is
overstated, comparing the decline in strikes with that which has taken
place nationwide:
In fact, federal labor statistics show that strikes of all
sorts, in both the public and private sectors, decreased
sharply across the country in the 1980s. Analysts have
offered a variety of reasons for the trend, including
corporate restructurings and increased global competition
affecting the once heavily unionized manufacturing
sector. A watershed event in the history of American labor
relations came in 1981 with President Ronald Reagan's
tough response to a strike by federal air traffic controllers.
Overwhelming public support for Reagan's decision to

61. PERB by the Numbers, N.Y. ST. PUB. EMP. REL. BOARD (Apr. 28, 2018),
http://www.perb.ny.gov/perb-by-the-numbers/.
62. Id. (finding that (1) Approximately 2100 contract are negotiable each year; (2)
Approximately 15% of negotiations reach impasse (300-500) each year; (3) Approximately 70% of
all impasses settle in mediation ; and (4) Approximately 15% of the cases involve police and
firefighters where interest arbitration is the final step slightly fewer of these cases settle in mediation
(55-60%)).
63. See In Re Nassau Cmty. Coll., 47 N.Y. PERB 3006 (2014).
64. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 201 (Consol. 1995).
65. See generally, Counting Strike Threats, Monthly Lab. Rev., U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATISTICS
(May 2018), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2018/letters-to-editor/strike-threats.htm (discussing the
decrease in strikes statistics in the United States).
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fire and replace all the striking workers played an
important role in changing
the climate of labor relations
66
across the country.
As O'Neill's and McMahon's own graph shows, the rate of public
sector strikes in New York has fallen to much the same level, and
occasionally lower than the combined nationwide public and private
sector strikes, which they offer as comparators.6 7 However, the national
trend of diminishing strikes takes place against a backdrop of declining
union membership since 1983.68 By contrast, union membership in New
York State's public sector has remained strong throughout that same
period, and has remained roughly consistent from 2001 through 2017.69
Nor do either of the specific factors adverted to--corporate restructuring
and increased global competition-apply to New York State's public
sector employees. 70 Rather, the decline in strikes under the Taylor Law
demonstrates that the elimination of strikes can be achieved through
collective bargaining, and does not require a withering labor movement
or the enfeeblement of specific unioris.

1

Finally, 80% of improper practice claims are settled without a
decision with the mediation efforts of PERB's Administrative Law
Judges; the rest are resolved by binding decisions.72 Over the last decade,
exceptions to the Board have been filed in about one-third of the cases in

66. TERRY O'NEILL & E.J. McMAIION, TAYLOR MADE: THE COST AND CONSEQUENCES OF
NEW YORK'S PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR LAWS 6, 22-23 (Empire Ctr. for Pub. Policy ed., 2018).
67. [d. at 22, Fig. 4.

See id; see also Megan Dunn & James Walker, Union Membership in the United States,
LAB. STATISTICS 1-3 (Sept. 2016) https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/unionmembership-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf (noting a small
uptick in union membership - 0.1% - in 2017).
69. See, e.g., RUTH MILKMAN & STEPHANIE LUCE, THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 2017: A
68.

U.S.

BUREAU

PROFILE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK STATE, AND THE UNITED STATES
1, 3 fig.Ic (The Joseph S. Murphy Inst. for Worker Educ. and Labor Studies ed. 2017).
70. O'NEILL & MCMAHON, supra note 66, at 22.
71. See Arvid Anderson & Loren A. Krause, Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the Strike,

56 FORD L. REv 153, 177-178 (1987) (noting success of Taylor Law in both averting strikes and
leading to negotiated agreements or interest arbitration awards that "closely parallel one another").
Other commenters debate the effect of the anti-strike provisions on collective bargaining. Compare
Kate Montgomery Swearengen, Tailoring the Taylor Law: Restoring a Balance of Power to
Bargaining, 44 COLUM. J. LAW & SOC PROB. 513, 522-523 (2011) (claiming that Taylor Law strike
penalties are effective but at the expense of employees' ability to effectually negotiate) with TAYLOR
MADE, supra n. 66 at 23 ("Increasingly shielded from management pressure by Taylor Law
amendments, court precedents and PERB rulings, the state's public-sector unions by the 1980s no
longer had much to strike over.").

72.

PERB by the Numbers, supra note 61.
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which ALJs have issued decisions.7 3 By the time an appeal to the Board
has been filed, settlement is much less likely; the Board has issued, on
average, one-third the number of decisions the ALJs have.74 From this
admittedly rough handling of PERB's internal and published data, an
imprecise but salient portrait-not a photograph, perhaps, but at least a
water color--of labor relations in New York State can be glimpsed.7 5
That picture is one of a system that is largely successful, with most
In sum, the
disputes being settled, rather than going to a binding decision.
76
portrait depicts the Taylor Law functioning as intended.
A.

ConciliationPracticesas An Alternative to Compulsory Binding
Arbitration

The fact that the vast majority of bargaining units (85%) and
employers are able to reach collective bargaining agreements without
PERB intervention alone reflects a fundamentally healthy system of
collective bargaining throughout the State.77 For those units and
employers, Bob Helsby's maxim that "the best agreement is one which
the parties reach themselves" has been brought to fruition.7 8
Strangers to PERB's conciliation processes might find the path
leading to reaching binding interest arbitration counter-intuitive. 79 In
other contexts under New York state law, the Court of Appeals has stated
that "arbitration is considered so preferable a means of settling labor
disputes that it can be said that public policy impels its use."8
Despite this general preference by the courts in other circumstances,
the Taylor Law only makes compulsory binding arbitration available to
create a final resolution when the parties cannot reach a collective
bargaining agreement for a subset of public employees, whose work
involves public safety. 81 That is not for lack of an alternative model; the
73.

See id.

74.

See id.

75.

See id

76. Public Employees' Fair Employment Act of 1967, ch. 392, 1967 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1527,
1527-28.
77. PERB by the Numbers, supra note 61.
78. Helsby, supra note 29, at 8.
79. THOMAS KOCHAN ET AL., The Long Haul Effects of InterestArbitration: The Case of New
York State's Taylor Law, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 565, 566 (2010).

80. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3,
Town of Huntington, 306 N.E.2d 791, 796 (N.Y. 1973); see also In re City of Oswego (Oswego City
Firefighters Assn., Local 2707), 988 N.E.2d 499, 501 (N.Y. 2013) (Lippman, J., dissenting) (quoting
Assoc. Teachers of Huntington v. Bd. of Educ., 988 N.E.2d 499, 501 (N.Y. 1973)).
81. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 209(2) & 209(3) (Consol. 1995).
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New York City Collective Bargaining Law, enacted together with the
Taylor Law, makes impasse arbitration (that law's equivalent process)
available to all public employees and employers falling under its
jurisdiction.82
Both the limited availability of interest arbitration and the steps
required to invoke that right are examples of the "choice architecture"
embedded in the Taylor Law. 83 Even for the subset of public employees
and employers who are eligible for binding interest arbitration, the Taylor
Law and PERB's Rules of Procedure provide that "interest arbitration is
only available under the [Taylor Law] when efforts of the parties
themselves to reach agreement through true negotiations and conciliation
procedures have actually been exhausted. 84
Those conciliation
procedures must be pursued in good faith by both parties before
empaneling an interest arbitration panel.85
The goal of the process is to steer all but the most entrenched parties
toward jointly resolving their differences through collective bargaining,
rather than having a resolution imposed by an external arbitrator. 86 This
preference in the Taylor Law is supported by several rationales, and has
functioned effectively since 1974.87
Asked in 1979 if he maintained his previously expressed belief that
"final and binding arbitration should be used only as a last extreme, the
last method," PERB Chair Harold Newman answered:
Yes, I don't like binding arbitration. First of all, I don't
know any labor relations professional who would not
argue that the best kind of agreement is an agreement
made by the parties themselves, without the intervention
at all of any third party neutral.
But if indeed a genuine impasse does occur, and the
parties are unable to reach agreement by themselves, then
certainly the favored way from my point of view for
achieving a settlement is through the device of mediation,
because they are the parties who are still making their own

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See New York City Collective Bargaining Law, N.Y. CODE tit. 12, § 12-311 (c) (2) (1998).
See City of Ithaca, 49 N.Y. PERB 3030, 3089 (2016).
Id. at 3097; N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 209(3) (Consol. 1995).
Id. (2016).
See Harold Newman, Interest Arbitration:Impressions of a PERB Chairman,37 ARB. J.

7, 8 (1982).
87.
Helsby, supra note 44, at 8-9.
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agreement as an extension of the collective bargaining
process, and the mediator is simply serving as a kind of
marriage counselor.
In fact-finding, I would like to think that again that since
the fact-finding report can be accepted or rejected by the
with
a kind of mediation
parties, there is
recommendations, and that too is more acceptable to me
than arbitration. Arbitration means the parties have
turned their responsibility for their contract terms over to
somebody else."8
In another article, he explained that collective bargaining is
inherently preferable to binding arbitration, on the ground that "[n]o labor
neutral, no matter what his or her background, skills, education, or
experience, can know as much about the parties' needs as they do." 89
Moreover, "the neutral doesn't live with the contract-the parties do." 90
As a result, Newman cautioned that:
[T]hose of us who head neutral agencies and are
responsible for the appointment of mediators, arbitrators,
and factfinders should always be on guard against
intervening too early in negotiations. We should strive to
be certain that exhaustive good faith effort by the parties
to achieve agreement on their own has been made before
providing the services of an impartial.9
The other "major attack on binding arbitration made by its critics is
that it will have a 'chilling' effect upon the bargaining process. 9 2 Binding
arbitration "will inevitably undermine collective bargaining, it is argued,
whenever either party anticipates that they might gain more from
arbitration than from negotiation;" this "'narcotic' effect supposedly leads

88. Harold Newman, Opinion, Viewpoint: HaroldR. Newman, PERB Chairman,Feb. 1979, 3
N.Y. ST. PUB. EMP. COMMUNICATOR 4.
89. Newman, supra note 86, at 8.

90.
91.

Id. at 8.
Id. at8.

92. Charles M. Rehmus, Interest Arbitration, in THE EVOLVING PROCESS--COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 249, 257 (Robert D. Helsby, Jeffrey Tener & Jerome
Lefkowitz eds., 1985); see also Charles M. Rehmus, Interest Arbitration in LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: REDEFINING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 196 (John L. Bonner ed.

1999).
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to ever-increasing reliance on arbitration." 93 In the scholarly literature
regarding interest arbitration, the data has been read to support
conclusions that "chilling and narcotic effects" will result as to collective
bargaining. 94 Even the limited interest arbitration provisions under the
Taylor Law are not entirely immune; as then-Chair Pauline Kinsella
pointed out in 1993, PERB's impasse resolution proceedings "are not,
however, intended, as they are sometimes being used, as a substitute for
collective bargaining and
as a means to shift elsewhere the responsibility
95
for making decisions."
In another example of "choice architecture," PERB's interest
arbitration panels are tripartite in nature--each side appoints one member,
who together jointly select the public member. 96 Under the Taylor Law,
the parties' appointed members effectively advocate for their respective
clients. 97 This means that the process is only one of arbitration in the last
resort, after the parties, first directly, and then through their panel
members, have failed to agree. Up until that moment, interest arbitration
is effectively mediation under another name.
Again, Newman:
Tripartiteinterest arbitrationis certainly a misnomer. No
neutral arbitrator can chair a panel with two partisan
arbitrators and function as anything but a mediator. This
is not necessarily bad, but we ought to recognize tripartite
arbitration for what it is-more mediation than
arbitration. Heaven forbid that any arbitrator without
mediation experience and skill undertake chairing a
tripartite panel.98

93.
Rehmus supra note 93, at 257-58; see also, Gary E. Bolton & Elena Katok, Reinterpreting
Arbitration'sNarcotic Effect: An Experimental Study in Repeated Bargaining,25 GAMES & ECON.
BEHAV. 1,2 (1998) (describing "substantial field evidence that bargaining with arbitration lessens the
likelihood that bargainers will reach a settlement on their own."); Hoyt N. Wheeler, Compulsory
Arbitration:A "NarcoticEffect"?, 14 INDUS. REL. 117, 117-20 (1975).
94. Rehmus supra note 92, at 257-58.
95. PAULINE R. KINSELLA, PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR DEVELOPMENTS 2 (1993).
96. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §209(4) (Consol. 1995). Again, this is not the only direction in
which the Legislature could have gone-or indeed, did go. See New York City Collective Bargaining
Law, N.Y. CODE tit. 12, § 12-31 1(c) (2) (1998). The New York City Collective Bargaining Law
provides that the parties nominate members of the impasse panel, but the Chair of the Board of
Collective Bargaining, in her capacity as Director of the Office of Collective Bargaining itself
appoints the panel members unless the parties' nominations coincide. Id.
97. See KINSELLA, supra note 95, at 4-5.

98.

Newman, supra note 86, at 8.
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Once again, the Taylor Law nudges the parties to craft their own
solution.
By leaving so much responsibility in the hands of the parties, the
Taylor Law allows for the risk of ongoing deadlock when a relationship
breaks down, as when, in 2016, the Buffalo City School District and the
Buffalo Teachers Federation completed negotiations, "resulting in the
first collective bargaining agreement in over a decade" between the
parties.99 That this case was an outlier, as demonstrated by the statistics
cited above, does not mean that the fundamental trust in the parties to
reach agreement is without cost-though that cost is ameliorated by the
status quo provision of the Taylor Law, designed to keep both parties at
the table. 00
Moreover, the "choice architecture" and nudging of the Taylor Law
and PERB's rules can be effective even with parties who have evidenced
the narcotic effect of interest arbitration. 1 1 Such parties can break
through and reach agreement, often as a result of the successful
deployment of PERB's mediators. The City of New York and the New
York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association ("PBA") had, in the last
five rounds of bargaining prior to the 2016 negotiations, gone to interest
arbitration four times.10 2 The result of that fourth interest arbitration was
acrimonious, with the PBA-appointed member of the panel issuing a
dissent objecting to the process and describing the ultimate award as an
"odious decision and callous mistreatment of the City's 23,000 Police
Officers."' 3 Protests took place outside the home of the public member
of the panel, an unprecedented event.'°4
Despite this unpropitious setting, when the parties reached impasse
for the next contract in 2016, intensive mediation by PERB's Director of
Conciliation and a long-standing member of PERB's mediation panel,
10 5
himself an eminent arbitrator, helped the parties to reach agreement.
99. Buffalo Teachers Fed'n, 49 N.Y. PERB 4560, 4560-61 (2016).
100. PERB by the Numbers, supra note 61.
Richard Steier, ArbitrationLooms Again inPBA Wage Dispute, THE CHIEF LEADER (Aug.
101.
28, 2014), http://thechiefleader.com/arbitration-looms-again-in-pba-wage-dispute/article-9cfa6776127e-1 1e4-af63-001a4bcf6878.html.
102. Id.
Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of New York v. The City of New York, N.Y.
103.
ST.PUB. EMP. REL. BOARD Case No. IA2014-009;M2014-027, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2015) (Waks, Arb.,
dissenting).
104. Lorena Mongelli, NYC Police Union Protests Small Raises Outside Arbitrator'sHouse,
N.Y. POST (Nov. 5, 2015, 9:43 A.M.), http://nypost.comi2015/11/05/nyc-police-union-protests-

small-raises-outside-arbitrators-home/.
Press Release, Bill DeBlasio, Mayor of N.Y.C., Mayor DeBlasio and Patrolmen's
105.
2017),
(Jan. 31,
Tentative Five-Year Agreement
Announce
Benevolent Association
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Mayor Bill De Blasio, at the press conference announcing the agreement,
thanked:
[The] mediators who performed a crucial role in this
process. And perhaps our mediators don't get a lot of
headlines, but they do extraordinarily important work and
they help sides even when there is some disagreement
come together and found common ground. I want to thank
Kevin Flanigan from the Public Employ[ment] Relations
Board for his exceptional work and Marty [Scheinman],
06
who... played a crucial role as well.'
A half a century after the passage of the Taylor Law, PERB's Office
of Conciliation is effectively resolving the vast majority of contracts that
do not settle without assistance. And it still does so with the mediator's
philosophy that the "power of persuasion" and "unavoidable influence" in
the long run, provides "greater structure and formality of the process [and]
establishes a narrower range for settlement that positively affects
07
negotiating dynamics."'
B. "Rep " and the Business of the Board
Returning to Lefkowitz's summary of the Taylor Law, it had three
prongs: (1) that public employees have the right to join or not to join any
employee organization of their own choosing; (2) that public employers
are required to negotiate with the employee organizations which have
been chosen by their employees to represent them; and (3) the procedures
by which these two rights are protected. 108
Matters involving mediation, fact-finding, and interest arbitration
which the Office of Conciliation facilitates do not, as a general matter,
come before the Board. 0 9 They are indicative of the second component
1 0
of the summary-helping the parties to reach an agreement.
By contrast, the matters decided in the first instance by the staff of

http://wwwl .nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/062-1 7/transcript-mayor-de-blasio-patrolmen-s-

benevolent-association-tentative-five-year.
106. Id.
107.
Joshua M. Javits, Better Process, Better Results. IntegratingMediation and Arbitration to
Resolve Collective BargainingDisputes, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB & EMP. L. 167, 182 (2017).
108.
Leflkowitz, supra note 1, at 580.
109.
See infra note 125.
110.
Lefkowitz, supra note 1, at 575-76.
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PERB's Office of Public Employment Practices and Representation
(known as the "Rep Department" or just "Rep" internally) are the Board's
daily fare."' In large part, this is because those cases that go to decision
in the Rep Department are essentially legal in nature. That is, they are
binding decisions involving questions of the Taylor Law, as it has been
construed by the Board and the courts as applied to facts found by PERB's
Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs"), or its Director or Assistant Director
(each of whom hear cases in addition to their administrative roles)." 2
The questions of representation-unit definition and clarification, as
well as determining what union will represent a group of employees-are
handled in the first instance by the Rep Department, and then by the
Board. ' 3 So too are challenges to the threshold question of whether
employees are entitled to representation. 14
Under the Taylor Law, employees are presumed to be eligible for
representation for collective bargaining. 1 5 Unlike the broad exclusion for
"supervisors" under the National Labor Relations Act, only employees
determined by PERB to be "managerial" or "confidential" under § 201(7)
of the Taylor Law are barred from representation and collective
bargaining." 6 Under the statute, employees are "managerial" if "they are
persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who may reasonably be required
on behalf of the public employer to assist directly in the preparation for
and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in the
administration of agreements or in personnel administration provided that
such role is not of a routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of
independent judgment."' 17 Under the same section, employees may be
111. Overview, N.Y. ST. PUB. EMP. REL. BOARD (May 7, 2018), http://www.perb.ny.gov/perboverview/; see also Office of the Chairperson,N.Y. ST. PUB. EMP. REL. BOARD (Apr. 28, 2018),
http://www.perb.ny.gov/office-of-the-chairman/ (noting that it is one of the duties of the Public
Employment Relations Board to review appealed decisions of all Offices, including the Office of
Public Employment Relations Practices and Representation).
112. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 4 §201.10 (2019) (acting as the procedural rule of
the Public Employment Relations Board to have Administrative Law Judges decide on cases); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 4 § 201.11 (2019) (acting as a procedural rule that Public Employment
Relations Board cases decided by Administrative Law Judges are appealable to the Board); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 4 §213.10 (2019) (determining that when a case goes on appeal to the
Board, decisions made by the Board are final); see also Office of the Chairperson,supra note 111.
Office of Public Employment Practices & Representation, N.Y. ST. PUB. EMP. REL.
113.
http://www.perb.ny.gov/office-of-public-employment2018),
(Apr.
28,
BOARD.
practicesrepresentation/.
114. Id.
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 203 (Consol. 1995).
115.
116. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 201(7) (McKinney 1967); Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. ST.
PUB. EMP. REL. BOARD (Apr. 25, 2018), http://www.perb.ny.gov/frequently-asked-questions/.
117.
Id.
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designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist and act in a
confidential capacity to managerial employees engaged in labor relations
on behalf of the employer as described in clause (ii). "8
Improper practice charges are also handled by Rep. " 9 As is the case
with Conciliation, Rep's ALJ's successfully resolve through settlement
the vast majority of improper practice charges that come before them. To
again use an imperfect measure, for the period from 2009-2010 though
2014-2015, an average settlement rate computed by averaging cases filed
per year and cases pending at the beginning of each year with cases settled

yields an approximate settlement rate of 80%.120

For the same time

period, ALJs have issued, on average, 126 decisions per year.' 1
From 2009 through 2015, the Board decided, on average, thirty
improper practice cases per year. 2 2 Additionally, it has issued in each
year, on average, five representation decisions, twenty-one certification
decisions, and two unit placement or unit clarification decisions. In the
same time period, the Board issued one managerial/confidential
decision. 123 In sum, about a quarter of improper practice decisions by
24
ALJs are appealed to the Board, and most of these go to decision.
Because the Board functions as an appellate body, there are no
statutory or regulatory mechanisms to promote settlement once a case
goes before it. 125 Also, the parties often choose to appeal decisions to the

118. See id.
119. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 4 §204.1-18 (2019) (governing improper practice
charges).
120.
ROCKEFELLER INST. OF Gov., 2015 NEW YORK STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 314 (39th Ed.
2016). Calculating from reported figures from 2009-2010 through 2014-2015, averaging 812 cases
filed per year, with 663 settled or withdrawn cases, yielding an average settlement rate of 82%. Id.
An average of the year-by-year settlement rates measured against actual number of settled/withdrawn
cases per year yields an approximate settlement rate of 78% for the same time period. Id. Averaging
these two admittedly imperfect figures yields an average settlement rate for the period of 80%. Id.
Although the statistics have not been published yet, the years 2015-2016, 2016-2017 and 2017-2018
yield similar figures. Id. In 2015-2016, 884 cases were filed, and 786 were settled or otherwise
withdrawn, yielding a settlement percentage rate of 88.9%. Id. ALJs issued 143 decisions, and the
Board decided 52. In 2016-2017, 835 cases were filed, and 666 settled or withdrawn, a settlement
rate of 79.7%. Id. ALJs decided 117 cases, and the Board issued 50 decisions. Id. Likewise, in 20172018, 733 cases were filed, 630 settled or were otherwise withdrawn, yielding a settlement percentage
of 85.9%. ALJs issued 111 decisions, and the Board issued 67. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (calculating the pure average from 2009-2010 through 2014-2015 gives a slightly
higher average, that is, 34 cases per year; but in 2011-2012, the Board decided 51 improper practice
cases, an aberrantly high number for that period that skews the average in a misleading way).
123. Id.
124. Id. at314.
125. Raymond D. Horton, Public Employee Labor Relations Under the Taylor Law, 31 PROC.
OF THE ACAD. OF POL. SCI. 161, 161-174 (1974).
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Board to clarify the Taylor Law's application to difficult or unprecedented
facts, or to obtain clarity as to how the Taylor Law's policies or prior cases
should be followed when they are in conflict. 126 In such cases, unlike the
mediator's ideal, the answer can be more valuable than the settlement.
When the Taylor Law was first enacted, PERB was not explicitly
given jurisdiction over improper practices by either management or
labor.1 27 In 1967, Jerry Lefkowitz "took the lead in preparing PERB's
rules of procedure," including drafting the first prohibition of improper
practices, which was struck down by the courts in 1968.128 The following
year, the Legislature amended the Taylor Law statute to add § 209-a,
which defines improper practices on the part of both labor and
management.

129

The Taylor Law gives PERB "exclusive, non-delegable

jurisdiction" over improper practice charges.13 0
It is an improper practice for an employer to do any of the following:
(1) interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of,
their rights under the Taylor Law for the purpose of depriving them of
such rights; (2) dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any employee organization for the purpose of depriving them of such
rights; (3) discriminate against any employee for the purpose of
encouraging or discouraging membership in, or participation in the
activities of, any employee organization; (4) refuse to negotiate in good
faith with the duly recognized or certified representatives of its public
employees; (5) refuse to continue all the terms of an expired agreement.
until a new agreement is negotiated, unless the employee organization
which is a party to such agreement has, during such negotiations or prior
to such resolution of such negotiations, engaged in strike-related conduct
as prohibited by 210(1) of the Taylor Law; (6) utilize any state funds
appropriated for any purpose to train managers, supervisors or other
administrative personnel regarding methods to discourage union
organization or to discourage an employee from participating in a union
organizing drive; (7) fail to permit or refuse to afford a public employee
the right, upon the employee's demand, to representation by a
representative of the employee organization when at the time of
questioning by the employer of such employee it reasonably appears that
he or she may be the subject of a potential disciplinary action; or (8) to
Office of the Chairperson,supra note 111.
126.
127. Id.
128. See Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 21 N.Y.2d 541, 554 (N.Y. 1968); see also
DONOVAN, supra note 41, at 64, 77.
129.
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(a) (McKinney 1969).
130. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 205(5)(a) (Consol. 1995).
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disclose home addresses, personal telephone numbers, personal cell phone
numbers, or personal e-mail addresses of public employees except where
mandated by the Taylor Law, court order, a subpoena or other legal
process. 3 '
It is an improper practice for a union to: (1) interfere with, restrain
or coerce public employees in the exercise of the rights to form, join and
participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining, or participating in, any
employee organization of their own choosing; 132 (2) to refuse to negotiate
collectively in good faith with a public employer; or (3) to breach its duty
of fair representation to public employees.
The board's decisions with respect to improper practice charges are
subject to judicial review as to whether the decision "was affected by an
error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion," or
not "supported by substantial evidence."1' 33 The board "is accorded
' 34
deference in matters falling within its area of expertise."'
The board's primary purpose is, as it has been since the beginning,
deciding those questions of law that don't get resolved by settlement or
collectively bargained agreements. 135 In deciding cases, the board has the
additional responsibility of providing guidance for the parties and their
representatives.136 The board must flesh out the necessarily broad
language of the Taylor Law-whether a union's demand to bargain over
a specific term and condition of employment is a mandatory subject of
bargaining, or whether it falls within management's right to assign duties,
select equipment, and organize how those assignments are performed.
PERB's experience, and the extent to which its decisions have been
accepted by the parties and stood the test of time, have vindicated Pauline
Kinsella's judgment that:
I believe that without strong governmental agencies
which are respected by all parties, the process of
collective bargaining is placed in extreme jeopardy. I
don't believe the parties will police themselves, and I
131.
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-(a)(1) (Consol. 1995). The prohibition of release of personal
contact information is contained in a new § 209-(a)(1) (h), added by NYS Sess. Laws 2019, ch. 55,
Part E (April 12, 2019).
132.
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§202, 209-(a)(2) (Consol. 1995).
133. See N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209-a(4)(c) (Consol. 1995); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7803
(Consol. 2011) (specifying the standard of review).
134. In re Kent v. Lefkowitz, 27 N.Y.3d 499, 505 (N.Y. 2016).
135. See N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 209(2) (Consol. 1995); see also N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(3)
(Consol. 1995).
136. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209(3)(d) (Consol. 1995).
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don't believe ad hoc arbitrators will adequately focus on
the public interest as they review cases brought by
specific parties. I believe governmental agencies should
provide law enforcement functions. 137
PERB has successfully provided those functions since it was granted
improper practice jurisdiction in 1969.138 Part of how it has done so is by
fostering a jurisprudential consistency and consensus as to the guiding
principles it sets out.
The Board has, sought to achieve consensus among its three
members throughout its history. 39 Of course, dissents are welcome where
a principled disagreement cannot be reconciled, and have sometimes been
prophetic. 140 However, the members of the Board, present as well as past,
prize the virtue of providing clear, non-partisan guidance. The virtue of
clarity is best served when all of the members of the Board can agree on
a final articulation of a result that serves the Taylor Law, and the Board's
members work to consensus in the vast majority of cases. This culture of
consensus inherently stabilizes the Board. While members come, and go,
bringing with them their own experience and viewpoints, the Board is not
noted for the partisan swings that some scholars see in decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board.1 41 Indeed, that has long been the case;
Ronald Donovan wrote in 1990 that:
[w]hereas observers of the National Labor Relations
Board often speak of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, or
Reagan Board as a shorthand way of indicating a
particular labor policy orientation associated with the
political views of the incumbent president, the policies of
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairwoman, N.Y. State Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., Privatizing the
137.
Public Interest: Who Needs the Impartial Agencies?, Presentation at the Pub. Emp't Relations Bd., at
3-4 (July 27, 1997) (transcript available at New York State Public Employment Relations Board).
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 209(a) (McKinney 1969).
138.
139. See DONOVAN, supra note 41, at 153-157.
140. Id. at 157-59.
141.
See Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board. The Transformationof the NLRB,
1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L. J. 1361, 1365-1.366 (2000) ("In short, the once unimaginable has now
become the norm, and the modem-day NLRB looks like nothing so much as the tripartite model for
the agency that was explicitly considered and decisively rejected by the Wagner Act Congress"); see
also Zev J. Eigen & Sandro Garofalo, Less Is More: A Casefor StructuralReform of the National
Labor Relations Board, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1879, 1884 (2014) ("The [National Labor Relations]
Board's approach is-some might say 'notoriously'-marked by frequent shifts in precedent when
the administration changes, combined with a policy of non -acquiescence with federal appellate court
rulings until the Supreme Court ultimately decides an issue").
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PERB have been remarkably constant over its history,
irrespective of state administration, agency leadership, or
42
board composition. 1
In deciding cases, the Board explains its results in written opinions,
and relates them to prior Board decisions, old and new. Like any common
law system, the Taylor Law, as supplemented by its Rules of Procedure,
requires careful, fact-driven decisions explaining why the material facts
at issue mandate the result the Board has arrived at. The Board's decisions
serve the additional purpose of persuasion, of demonstrating that a given
result is rooted in the Taylor Law and in the caselaw that has developed
over the years, and not a result of favoring one party over another.
Our written opinions also make us, as former Chair Pauline Kinsella
put it, "publicly accountable" because "our decisions are in the public eye
and they are carefully scrutinized. 4 3 The public nature of what we do
144
makes a difference.'
Two other institutional constraints on the Board are the record
compiled by the ALJs and the scope of appeal of their decisions to the
Board. 145 The ALJs conduct the hearings, where necessary; they weigh
the credibility of witnesses, and apply the Taylor Law and the Rules, as
well as the Board's prior decisions. 46 The Board defers to the AL's
factual findings, especially when they are based in whole or in part on the
AL's weighing of the credibility of the witnesses' testimony on a
disputed factual question. 47 The AL's written opinion also frames the
issues before the Board; under PERB's Rules, parties must file specific
exceptions to an AID decision, and questions of law or fact not raised
before the ALJ and excepted to before the Board are waived. 48
Where no board decisions address the precise matter at issue, the
ALJs may consult the published decisions of their predecessors and
colleagues as ALJs. Sometimes, they must do their best in the absence of
49
any guidance at all.'

142. DONOVAN, supra note 32, at 154.
143.
Kinsella, supra note 137, at 4.
144. Id.
145. See tit. 4 §§ 201.1,213(l) (2019).
146. See tit. 4 § 212.4(a), (d).
147. Payson, 50 N.Y. PERB 3002, 3008 (2017) (citing, inter alia, Fashion Inst. of Tech. v.
Helsby, 44 A.D.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1974)).
148.
See tit. 4 § 213.2 (b)-(4); see also Burke, 49"N.Y. PERB 3021, 3072, n. 4 (2016).
149. See generally R. Terrance Harders, Striking a Balance: Administrative Law Judge
Independence andAccountability,19 J. NAT'L AsS'N ADMIN L. JUDGES 1, 4-5 (1999) ("To the extent
that administrative law judges, in deciding cases concerning enforcement and disputes, pass on the
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In such cases, the importance of the Board's review is clear. Only
the Board can provide clarity-an ALJ decision, however well thought
out and persuasive, only binds the parties to that decision, even if no
appeal is filed.15 °
These rules are not meant to make an appeal to the board a
technicality-strewn minefield. Rather, they make sure that an appeal is a
review of the facts and issues presented to the ALJ,and not a second bite
at the apple.
Recent chairs have steadily sought to reduce the technical nature of
pleading before PERB. 151Under Jerry Lefkowitz, who returned to PERB
in 2007, (this time as chair, serving until January 2015), the directors and
the deputy chair began a thorough review of PERB's rules. 1 52 This rules
revision was the first since 1999, and the proposed amended rules were
thoroughly reviewed and revised again under Seth Agata, my immediate
predecessor as chair. 153 When I was appointed chair in 2016, I inherited
the work begun by Jerry and Bill Herbert (with the help of Kevin Flanigan,
Monte Klein, David Quinn, and Anthony Zumbolo), and continued under
Seth (with my input as deputy chair, and that of all the directors who had
With additional valuable
served under both Jerry and Seth). 154
Coleman,
the rules were formally
of
Deputy
Chair
Sarah
contributions
adopted on August 2, 2017.'
Under these new rules, pleading is less technical while electronic
filing has been adopted and is being phased in. Likewise, practices (some
of which were reflected in the board's decisions, others simply known to
experienced practitioners before the agency, but not to newer practitioners
or individuals without representation), are now incorporated into the rules.
validity of agency statutory interpretation and rules, administrative law judges take upon themselves
the role of the courts and stand, potentially at least, in the way of agency policy-making").
150. Police Benevolent Ass'n of New York State, Inc., 50 N.Y. PERB 3001, n. 42 (2017)
(citing Nassau Cty. Sheriffs Corr. Officer's Benevolent Ass'n, 48 N.Y. PERB 3023, at 3089 n. 89
(2015)) (determining that a decision of an ALI is not binding on the Board and has no precedential

value).
151. Nassau Cty. Sheriff's Corr. Officer's Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 49 N.Y. PERB T 3001 (2016).
152. William A. Herbert, Jerome Lefkowitz: A Pragmatic Intellect and Major Figure in Taylor
Law History, in John F. Wirenius, ed., The Taylor Law At 50: Public Sector Labor Relations In A
Shifting Landscape, 577, 582-583 (2019).
153.
John F. Wirenius, Profile of Seth H. Agata, N.Y. ST. PUB. EMP. REL. BOARD. (Apr. 28,
2018), http://www.perb.ny.gov/wp-content/uploads/20 18/04/seth-agata.pdf.
154.
See NYS Public Employment Relations Board Through the Years, N.Y. ST. PUB. EMP. REL.
BOARD (Apr. 28, 2018), http://www.perb.ny.gov/perb-through-the-years/ (referring to when the
author began as chairman of the board).
155.
Rules and Regulations of the Public Employment Relations Board When Acting Pursuant
to Article 14 of the Civil Service Law, N.Y. ST. PUB. EMP. REL. BOARD (Oct. 9, 2018)
https://www.perb.ny.gov/rules-of-procedure/.
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In the same time period, the Board has moved to eliminate
technicalities that harmed both management and labor. 156

So, for

example, the Board has overruled precedent penalizing both labor and
management for failing to recite a precise formula of words in its
pleadings when the essence of the claim or defense is clear from the
pleadings. 157
Likewise, we continue to reduce our backlog of undecided cases,
promoting more efficient resolution of disputes. As we have hired new
staff to fill the places of those who have retired, we at PERB intend to
resolve cases with full consideration, but to ensure that processing of cases
can be done in a timely basis, so that our remedies actually make the
parties whole, and promote the policies and values of the Taylor Law.
As PERB moves forward into its second half-century, the agency is
cultivating a new generation of staff, as well as encountering a new
generation of clientele and constituents. This anniversary year is not just
a celebration but it is the beginning of a new era, as many experienced
practitioners and parties retire or move on to other concerns. At the same
time, changes at the national level, and the revitalization of communities
throughout the State, present new challenges to State and local employers,
and to the individuals comprising their workforces, as well as the unions
representing them.158 The post-World War II settlement, the latter years
of which birthed PERB, has ended. The challenges of the nascent era in
which we start this second half-century are starkly different from those of
the first.
Among the most significant of these challenges are the expected
tectonic shift in the labor relations landscape created by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Janus.159 In that case, the Court found that
state labor relations statutes or agreements violated the First Amendment
by requiring public employees who are not union members to pay fees to
unions whose representational efforts and collective bargaining
agreements the nonmember employees benefit from.160 In so ruling, the

156.

Nassau Cty. Sherriff's Corr. Officers' Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 49 N.Y. PERB

3001

(2016) (deeming management's mislabeling defense of "duty satisfaction" as one of "waiver" not
fatal); Suffolk Cty. Deputy Sheriffs PBA, 49 N.Y. PERB 3005 (2016) (reversing an ALJ's finding
that a union had failed to timely plead repudiation as an improper practice when it asserted a
contractual claim, only to be met with a deferral claim).
157.
Nassau Cty. Sherriff's Corr. Officers' Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 49 N.Y. PERB
3001
(2016); Cty. Deputy Sheriffs PBA, 49 N.Y. PERB 3005 (2016).
158.
See Kinsella supra note 25 (noting the beginning of some of these trends in the public

sector in 1997).
159.
160.

See Janus 138 S.Ct. at 2463, 2464.
Id. at 2483, 2486.
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Court overturned 40 years of its own precedent, with roots stretching back
"
' The decision may destabilize well-flmctioning
another 20 years. 16
collective bargaining relationships at the stroke of a pen.
Although legislation has been passed and signed into law by the
Governor to ameliorate the potential impact of Janus, harmonizing these
new amendments to the Taylor Law with the structure of the law, and the
reciprocal obligations that form the heart of the Taylor Law, will present
issues for PERB to resolve as the scope of the decision's impact becomes
clear. 162 Likewise, determining what, if anything, remains of the
provisions that are cast into doubt by the Janus opinion will present more
issues to the Board to decide, at least in the first instance. In all of these
issues, we must be guided by the reciprocal obligations of public
employers and employees to each other, and to the public they serve.
As we begin to address those challenges, our core mission remains
unaltered-which is, at heart, nothing less than facilitating the efficient
delivery of services to the people of the State of New York, while
respecting the inherent dignity and value of all those whose work is a part
of providing those services. In a newly unstable environment with
significant change, we at PERB, like others in the field, must also raise
our own standards. As new participants from both management and labor
come to the bargaining table, they will need to learn to manage the
intricate, relationship-driven, but ultimately productive, arts of labor
relations.
As an agency, we intend to use this anniversary
commemoration as a catalyst to re-launch our long dormant educational
mission, for the benefit of the parties, and the people, as provided for by
the Taylor Law. 163 But teaching how things were done is not sufficient in
itself. We intend to continue to advance and learn how to adapt the values
of collective bargaining and of dispute resolution, to continue "to promote
harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its
the orderly
employees and to protect the public by assuring, at all times,
' 64
and uninterrupted operations and functions of government."'
And then we continue to do just that-get out and promote
harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its
employees-in the field, at the bargaining table, and, where necessary, in

161. Id. at 2479, 2483, 2486.
162. GovernorCuomo Signs Legislation to Protect the Rights of New York's Working Men and
Women, N.Y. ST.: PRESSROOM (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governorcuomo-signs-legislation-protect-rights-new-yorks-working-men-and-womnen; NY Laws 2018, Ch.
59, Pt. RRR; NY Laws 2019, Ch. 56, Part. DD.
163. See N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 205 (Consol. 1995).
164.

N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 200 (Consol. 1995).
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our legal processes. At its best, the Board and the Agency strive to uphold
both sides of the reciprocal duties owed by the parties to each other, but
ultimately to the people of the State of New York.
All of these initiatives and resolutions, as well as our revised Rules,
are intended to protect the two substantive rights provided by the Taylor
Law-the right to representation and the right to negotiate terms and
conditions of employment. The Taylor Law created PERB as a referee
and facilitator to ensure that employees entitled to representation can
exercise that right if they so choose. PERB ensures that the parties'
negotiations are conducted in good faith, without coercion or the fear of
reprisal; that all subjects that are mandatorily negotiable can be negotiated
to fruition; and to assist the parties when their negotiations break down
despite their good-faith efforts.
As a wise man once wrote, the rest is all procedural.
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